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Abstract
The allocation of time and effort within the communities of Open Source Software devel-
opers is an interesting yet relatively unexplored area. How can coordination be achieved,
absent monetary rewards? How do developers choose where to direct their efforts amongst
the thousands of existing software projects? How come the vast majority of Open Source
projects is a failure, i.e. does not go beyond the announcement phase? The paper proposes
a simple dynamic stochastic model that addresses these issues. The model is a non-strategic
N-player dynamic interaction, in which players are asked to open, join or leave projects that
are assigned a random probability of survival, a proxy for the project-launcher skills. The
number and nature of open projects varying with time, players face a continuously chang-
ing landscape. The model is simulated using a simple agent-based code, and tested in a lab
with human subjects. Results show that the model can replicate most of the stylized facts
of the SourceForge.net dataset, namely the high number of lurkers hopping from project to
project and the highly skewed distribution. The experimental evidence supports the main
behavioral hypothesis of the model, interestingly showing that human subject tend to con-
sistently launch more projects than maximizing behavior would imply.
Keywords. Open Source software, Experimental Economics, Agent-Based Models
JEL classification. L17
[...] Programmers’ incentives give rise to an interesting form of ’network
externalities’ or ’strategic complementarities’, as programmers assess the
future as well as the current viewership of their contributions. The study
of the resulting dynamics would have implications not only to the study
of open source development and working, but also to other areas such as
the evolution of scientific research across fields.
Lerner and Tirole (2001)
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction1
The production of Open Source software, a pure public good, by communities of mainly vol-
unteer developers is a stunning fact that defies explication through traditional economic the-
ory. The allocation of time and effort within the community of developers is another area in
which we lack understanding. How can coordination be achieved, absent monetary rewards?
How do developers choose where to direct their efforts amongst the thousands of software
projects opened at any time, many of which appear to be just duplications of similar projects?
How come the vast majority of Open Source projects is a failure, i.e. does not go beyond the
announcement-planning phase?
Despite claims of the community being organised as a bazaar (Raymond, 1998), in which
software is produced by myriads of little interventions by hundreds of developers in a scat-
tered fashion, data collected from the SourceForge.net development website, on which ∼1.7
million developers are registered, taking part into ∼150.000 software projects, support a dif-
ferent picture of how the community works.
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Figure 1: Developers in projects, SQL query on FLOSSmole (2008) data
As many studies and cooperative effort at data-mining (Madey et al., 2004; Weiss, 2005;
Howison et al., 2006) show, only a fraction (∼10%) of the projects are active, and only very
few of the active projects attract many developers and are real Free/Open Source (FOSS)
success stories; moreover, new projects keep being produced, the huge amount of projects in
idle state notwithstanding. The distribution of developers across projects is highly skewed,
with the vast majority (∼ 80%, that is more than a hundred thousand) of projects featuring
1This paper, and all the research it summarizes, have been produced using only Open Source software. I had to
put this note somewhere. Here it is.
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only one developer (i.e. the project owner), while only few projects have a significant number
of developers contributing code (n > 10 is already a rare occurrence, let alone n > 50). The
density of projects with N developers in them can be fitted by a power law (see Figure 1): this
means that the distribution is highly skewed to the left, and has a very long right tail. Other
indicators of project activity (bug opened and closed, feature requests, mailing list activity)
show more or less the same skewed distributions; less effort-intensive activities - like asking
for a feature to be added to the code - show less skewed distribution than more effort-intensive
activities, like filing accurate bug reports, provide translations, and coding (for a detailed, if
dated, survey of all data see Weiss (2005)). The distribution of developers across projects will
be used as the central stylised fact of the data, and will be the focus of the model. Moreover,
the data show a very high mobility of developers across projects, again featuring a highly
skewed distribution, with few developers staying in the same project for a long time and
the vast majority devoting at best discontinuous effort in many different projects (David and
Rullani, 2006).
The picture that emerges is one in which very few big projects attract developers and
activity, while the vast majority of projects are contributed to the community but end up being
scarcely visible and do not attract any collective effort. Participation is very high, mainly in
the form of launching small projects; success rate is extremely low, few big projects appearing;
turnover of developers in projects and of success of projects is rather high. A project can gain
very fast a big audience, and be forked and replaced in the medium term.
The typical success story of an Open Source project involves a brilliant young computer
geek posting a more-or-less working initial release of a software on the Internet, gathering
attention and support from fellow developers, successfully mastering the art of building a
community of user-developers around his code, usually made up of a small bunch of core de-
velopers and a higher number of “lurkers” or occasional developers, at some stage attracting
funding from firms interested in the code, and finally establish himself and/or the project as
a standard software used by millions of people2.
While an interesting and yet not completely answered question is “why would a ‘top-
notch programmer’ decide to initiate a project in the first place by rendering freely available
on the web code that might have significant commercial value if taken private?”(Rossi, 2006)3,
another set of interesting questions concerns the organisation of the community of develop-
ers, i.e. the incentives faced by the developers that join existing projects, working on someone
else’s small or big idea, or hop from a project to another, or else decide to set up their own
project, hoping it would garner community support. More generally, the focus of an interest-
ing set of issues could be the dynamics of contributions within the community at large (the set
of active FOSS projects), and its effects on the nature and quality of active projects, and on the
returns to developers taking part in the game4. Taking for granted the decision of developers
to contribute code as a pure public good for free under a copyleft license such as the GPL (FSF,
2007), how do these developers coordinate, what projects do they join, how do they enter and
leave, and what kind of picture emerges from their choices?
The paper proposes a simple dynamic stochastic model that addresses these issues. The
model is a non-strategic N-player dynamic interaction, in which players open, join, leave,
re-enter projects, their payoff being directly affected by their actions and indirectly linked to
the other player’s past actions, through the landscape of open projects available at any period.
2This is the rough baseline for a story of Linux, Apache, KDE, and many FOSS success stories; a variant of the
story is one in which the initial more-or-less working software is provided by a company that used to develop it but
finds it unprofitable to continue, and hence “frees” the software to the community: it is the case of Mozilla Firefox,
or OpenOffice.org.
3The question has been tackled in the economics literature for some time now, see Johnson (2001); Lerner and
Tirole (2000) for two different approaches
4For an analysis of the dynamics of contributions within projects, see Rullani (2006))
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The interactions of players contribute in creating a dynamically evolving ecology of projects, a
project landscape; the ecology of projects is let free to evolve, in an open-ended path-dependent
process, within which the players make maximising choices.
Newly created projects are assigned as their unique characteristic a random probability,
that stands as a proxy for the project-launcher skills and for the project quality. The probability
is unknown prior to the choice but becomes public knowledge after the project is created,
mimicking the fact that open source software quality is very easily assessed, since the code is
open, i.e. readable, by everyone5. Players inherit the probability of the projects they are in as
their survival probability. Every player is free to join any of the projects opened at any time,
enjoying full information about the project characteristics; joining a project nonetheless entails
a cost, since the joiners will inherit only a fraction of the project’s probability, decreasing in
their rank in the project. At the end of any period, a random process expels from projects
the players that do not have a high enough survival probability; this process generates a flow
of exits and re-entries in projects, allowing to analyze the issues related to the emergence of
practices in the communities of developers with a lower number of players than the actual
hundreds of thousand.
The model is simulated using a very simple agent-based simulation code, and tested in
a lab with human subjects. Following methodological hints from Duffy (2006) and Epstein
(2005), the paper combines the power of the two different methodologies of agent-based com-
putational economics (ACE) and experimental economics (EE), using each of them for what
it can do best6. The simulation is used to explore the aggregate outcome of the dynamic
model in time, given a set of basic behavioural assumptions, exploiting computing power to
explore the model with a high number of agents for many simulated periods. The experiment
is instead used to assess the validity of the basic behavioural assumptions employed in the
simulation and in the model, focusing on a narrower (but significant) number of subjects; the
behavioural pattern that can be identified in the experiment can in turn be used to fine tune
the parameters of the simulation.
Simulation results show that the model can replicate some of the stylized facts of the
SourceForge.net dataset, namely the highly skewed distribution of players across projects,
the emergence of few big projects and the perpetual novelty of new project creation. More-
over, the model operates as an evolutionary selection mechanism, the landscape of existing
projects tending to have a higher average quality as the simulation progresses in time. The
preliminary experimental evidence (only 3 sessions where held) supports the main behav-
ioral assumptions of the model (∼ 80% of choices are predicted by the model), interestingly
showing that errors can be grouped in categories, different errors being much more likely to
occur in some situations rather than others. Human subject tend to consistently launch more
projects than maximizing behavior would imply, and to have a somewhat lower preference
for being leaders, even when this is suboptimal. The results of the experiment can then be
used to fine-tune the behaviour of the simulated artificial agents7.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model structure and main as-
sumptions and Section 3 reports the results of the simulation of the model, carried out with
a very simple agent-based model written in Python. In Section 4 the case for running a hu-
man subject lab experiment alongside the simulated model is made, and the design chosen is
detailed; the results of the experiment, both at the aggregate and individual level, as well as
5A computer program is a logically structured set of instructions, written in a human-readable formal language
(the source code), that can be translated into binary code readable by the computer (the executable code) and used by
this computer to perform a series of operations. Executable (binary) code is not easily decrypted, while source code
is a set of text files written in standard computer languages.
6For an example of a well known paper adopting the same combination of ACE and EE, see Duffy (2001)
7This has not been done so far, since a deeper understanding of the behaviour of subjects in the experiment is
needed. The experimental evidence is preliminary.
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the implications of these results for fine-tuning the simulations and the model are outlined in
section 5. Section 6 concludes, suggesting paths of future research.
2 The Model
The aim of this model is to build a simple and highly-stylized mechanism to capture the
dynamics of contribtuions in the world of Open Source Software. The focus is on the choices
of developers within the FOSS communities, taking for granted the choice of contributing to
a public good. In other words, once a developer is committed to FOSS, i.e. has decided to
contribute to a public good, which public good will be better for him to support? And what
will the overall consequences of the choices be? Why do developers rather launch a new
project than join existing ones, even when abandoned projects by the hundreds are strong
evidence that success rates are very low?
The choice of the project(s) in which to devote one’s effort seems to have aspects related
to coordination games, in which the return from one’s choice crucially depends on the other
players’ choices. It would be better to be the leader of a big project than the leader of a project
that gets abandoned, the problem being that “success” or “failure” crucially depend on every-
one else’s choices. Many projects could be viable if the community put efforts into them, but
ex-post only few attract such a big interest, success and failure being endogenous. Given these
insights, a first attempt at modeling the inner workings of the FOSS communities has been
made in a strategic dynamic N-player location setting (see the first chapter of the dissertation
in Crosetto (2007)). It proved very difficult, though, to analytically tackle and experimentally
explore a dynamic path-dependent N-players scenario with incomplete information and en-
dogenous uncertainty, as that model happened to be; in the literature, such a comprehensive
approach, including strategy, dynamics, externalities and feedbacks, plus a location dimen-
sion, has been pioneered only recently (Akiyama and Kaneko, 2000). The analysis could not
be carried out in closed form, required extensive use of numerical calculations, and led to a
situation of multiple equilibria; on the empirical side, the experiments proved to be plagued
by coordination problems, the pilots were not successful, and the whole endeavour appeared
cumbersome.
The choice made in order to overcome the difficulties was to strip the model of all si-
multaneous strategic interactions, setting the value of a project as exogenous, and randomly
assigned. Though this came at a cost in terms of adherence to the real picture, the model is
now dramatically and effectively simplified, while retaining some of its main characteristics.
The resulting model is a stochastic N-players dynamic model, in which agents do not act
strategically, as their payoffs do not depend directly on other players’ choices, but instead
choose the best option taking all the setting as given. Nonetheless, the model is different from
a simple choice problem, since it is dynamic and path-dependent, the choices of every player
shaping the future available options.
2.1 Model setup
The main idea is that developers act rationally, committing a project in the hope of getting
enough attention and fellow-contributors for the project to become a “star” in the FOSS com-
munity. The mechanism is quite simple: each developer faces a choice between joining some-
one else’s project (at a cost) or launching one’s own. Entry into, exit from or creation of
projects is driven by an indicator of “project success”, and to a cost of entry, that is increasing
in the number of developers already in a project. Project quality rates are exogenously given
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with a stochastic process, and once they are drawn they are public knowledge. In detail, the
model works as follows:
1. Each of N, (i = 1..N) players must simultaneously choose at every time period t, (t =
1..T ) between setting up a project (P ) or joining someone else’s (J); projects are indexed
j, (j = 1..J). Players can also switch from a project they are in into another already open
project, leaving the project they are currently in. Players can be in only one project at
any given period. The action space for any player is hence given by Ai = {P, J1..JJ}
2. The time horizon is finite, of length T , and this is known to players8.
3. Each time a player plays P , a project j is born with only one characteristic: a probability
pj , summarising the project qualities, drawn from a uniform [0, 1] distribution. This
probability stays the same over all the lifetime of a project, independently of how many
people join the project, even in the case in which the initial project launcher leaves the
project. A project dies, and is eliminated from the project landscape only when it has
no more players in it. The maximum number of projects open in every period has an
upper bound at N , the total number of projects opened in the T periods bounded as a
consequence to NT .
4. Players inherit from the project they launch or join their personal probability pij . The
personal probability of the players is a proxy of the player’s abilities, and serves as a
device to generate exit from and re-entry into projects:
• when players launch projects, they inherit completely the probability of the project
they created: (pij |Ai = P ) = pj .
• when players join projects, they inherit the probability of the project they join, dis-
counted by their rank in the project, i.e. by how many people are already in the
project. So (pij |Ai = Jj) = pj − δ#j in which #j is the number of players already
in project j at the moment of the choice, and δ is a parameter, 0 < δ < 1, that deter-
mines the cost of subsequent entries. This cost can be interpreted in terms of ability:
if I am not good enough to have a brilliant idea, I can join someone brighter, and
learn from him, even if this entails a cost. The more persons already in a project,
the more difficult it will be for me to get in and hence the higher the cost of joining.
5. The personal probability pij acts as a probability of survival until the next period. At
the end of each period each players draws a uniformly distributed [0, 1] number di. If
di > pij , the player is sent out of the project, while if di ≤ pij the player stays in the
project he has chosen.
6. Being in a project at the end of the period yields a positive payoff, normalised to 1; being
out entails a payoff of 0 for the current period.
7. All projects that still have players in them after the elimination phase will make up the
project landscape faced by players in the next period.
The timeline of a period of the model is summarised by Figure 2. Every period is made up
of four steps:
1. At the beginning of a period, every agent makes his choice given the project landscape.
Note that at time t = 0 every agents launches a project, since no project exists.
8A first version of the model incorporated an indefinite time horizon, with a probability of the game ending after
each period set to Π. Since the optimal strategies turned out to be independent of the time horizon, as we will see,
for simplicity’s sake a fixed length was assumed.
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Players choose action (draw, 
join, change) based on 
myopic expected returns
Players get a payoff if they 
are still in a project, get 
zero if they were expelled
For each player a random 
number is drawn, and 
players falling short are 
expelled from the project
CHOICE PHASE PAYOFF PHASEEXPULSION PHASE
Players observe the 
landscape of existing projects
LANDSCAPE
Period t
Figure 2: Model and simulation timeline
2. Death strikes: every agent draws a survival threshold, and if this is not met is expelled
from the project he’s in. Every project left with zero players in it disappears.
3. All agents that have not been eliminated receive a payoff of 1.
4. As a result of the preceding steps, a new project landscape appears: there will be up to N
projects open, each with its own publicly known pj , and each with a certain number of
players in it; some players will be out.
The model rests on some basic assumptions.
One-dimensional quality: developers in the real world face a landscape of active and aban-
doned projects, and have to choose if and in which project to devote their effort. Projects
do have different characteristics, and can give more or less return (in terms of satisfac-
tion, peer-recognition, learning opportunities, skill-signaling or else, see Lerner and Ti-
role (2000)) to the potential joiner, can be more or less open to contributions and more or
less difficult to integrate within. A first strong assumption is that all these characteristics
can be resumed by only one index, pj ∈ [0, 1].
Public knowledge: the pj for all projects is public knowledge. While this mirrors the fact that
the source code is open, and hence the strength and promise of a code can be assessed
by any prospective co-developer, the assumption of full public knowledge of project
quality remains strong.
Elimination: in the real world, developers do leave projects and launch new ones at a fast
rate, but the choice of leaving a project is not random and the turnover not as fast as in
the model. The device of elimination is needed to generate a high flow of entries and
exits from a low number of players, and is devised in a way as to hit only the worse
developers, which are more likely, even in the real world, to hop from project to project.
No growth: projects do not grow, nor change, in terms of both pj and payoff they give to the
leader or the joiners. A project is born with a given p¯j and dies with it. Leaders do not
extra benefit from having launched a successful project, apart from having ha high pij .
This assumption was needed in order to preserve the non-strategic nature of the game.
No memory of previous position: in the real FOSS communities, a player having contributed
much code to a project is considered its “guru” even after he’s left the project, and,
should he come back, a place in the Gotha is held for him. In the model, when a player
is expelled from a project, can re-enter it only with the rank position now available; the
fact that he could have been the leader of the project up to the previous period is not
taken into account.
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2.2 Solving the model
In a first version of the model, the agents were supposed to maximise their expected utility
over the whole length of the game, which was of indefinite length9. The model was solved
setting up a Bellman equation and proceeding by backward induction. The player was sup-
posed to maximise the lifetime expected payoff, given the assumption that he would behave
optimally from the moment he will be eliminated from a project onwards. The Bellman equa-
tion turned out to be a simple function of pij and of V 0, the value-to-go. This approach faced
two problems. First, V 0 had to be assumed to be independent of current and past choices by
the player or by the other players. This was needed in order for the Bellman to be solved,
but it was not justified on the ground of the model works. Imagine a player that stays for τ
periods in a project, and at the end of period τ is expelled. The choice problem that he will
face in period τ + 1 depends on the projects that will be available at that time, and on how
many other players will have joined which of these projects: it will be path-dependent. It
is not possible, hence, to assume that V 0 is a constant value, because it does depend on the
particular history of the play up to that point. Second, even when V 0 was assumed to be
constant, it turned out that the optimal decision was always to act myopically, i.e. to choose
the option that would have maximised the expected return from only one period.
Hence, the current version of the model was developed, featuring a fixed horizon and
assuming myopic behaviour on the part of agents. Agents maximise their utility myopically,
i.e. they choose the action that maximises their probability of being still in a project at the
end of the period, thus earning the payoff; moreover, players are assumed to be risk-neutral,
i.e. they have correct expectations on the stochastic process governing project launch. Since
when launching a project (playing P ) the project probability pj is drawn from a uniform [0, 1]
distribution,
E(pij |Ai = P ) = E(pj ∼ U [0, 1]) = 0.5.
The players will then choose to draw if and only if none of the available options give them
pij > 0.5, and will otherwise choose to join the best available project. Since the project pj are
public knowledge, only the best project will be joined. The optimal strategy for any player
would then be
A∗i =

P if pj < 0.5, ∀j = 1..J
Jj∗ if pj∗ = max{pj ,∀j = 1..J} > 0.5
Note that joining the project one is currently in is labeled here as “joining”, while it actually
is a slightly different act, that implies staying. Since it is more intuitive, in the lab the subjects
were told that the choice was between launching, joining and staying.
The optimal strategy is very simple, at the limit with triviality. The players just have
to spot the highest pj , and compare it with the expected value of drawing from a uniform
distribution. In the real world, this could mean that players just have to choose between
trying their luck as project leaders or join the project that is obviously the best. An equilibrium
of the game is simply a situation in which everyone plays his optimal strategy. The game not
being strategic, this is again a trivial condition to be met.
Nonetheless, the aggregate behaviour of the model and its dynamics show interesting
patterns. Even assuming that all players always are in equilibrium, i.e. always choose their
maximising strategy, the model shows the emergence of a skewed distribution of projects,
the sustained creation of new projects, evolutionary movement towards better projects and
lower amount of players out. But of course, these features appear only when we examine the
aggregate path-dependent behaviour of the model over time; and this is what agent-based
simulations are for.
9This was done by setting the probability of the game continuing at each time step equal to Π.
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3 Simulation results
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is now a well-established methodology within
economics. Starting from the simple but powerful segregation model by Schelling (1971),
a vast literature is now using computer programs to populate artificial worlds of more or
less boundedly-rational, more or less myopic agents and explore the consequences of their
more or less local interactions on the emergence of aggregate regularities. A comprehensive
methodological and practical survey has been supervised by Tesfatsion and Judd (2006). The
simulations performed for the simple model outlined above sit on the lower bound of ACE,
being populated with very simple, maximising agents, that are just programmed to behave
optimally in any situation. Nonetheless, the simulations share many features with more com-
plex agent-based models: several artificial agents are put into an interactive dynamic situation
of interest in order to better understand the aggregate implications of their micromotives on
the system’s macrobehaviour (Schelling, 1978)
The simulation has been coded using the scripting interpreted language Python, inte-
grated by a whole set of scientific extensions10.
The simulated model is in any detail identical to the formal model outlined above; agents
were myopic maximisers, with no forward-looking attitude, no learning, no other-regarding
preferences: they were just programmed to play their optimal strategy at every period. While
in theory the simulations could accommodate a very high number of agents, computation
needs - Python is very flexible but not very fast - limited the number of players to ∼ 1000;
results though showed no difference between populations of ∼ 100 to ∼ 1000 agents, and
hence a lower number of agents was chosen.
The simulations run were parameterized with N = 100, T = 500, δ = 0.2; moreover, the
simulation was run for 100 runs and the results were averaged over these runs, to clean the
data of any idiosyncratic stochastic effects.
The aggregate results of the simulations roughly match the main stylised facts of the
SourceForge.net dataset, namely w.r.t the distribution of players across projects, and give
some other hints on the aggregate behaviour of the model.
# of devs Sim density Real density
1 0.394 0.691
2 0.0817 0.1467
3 0.0567 0.0612
4 0.0339 0.0327
5 0.0393 0.0198
6 0.0307 0.0123
Table 1: Left tail of the distribution of projects by size, Simulated data
First, the distribution of players across projects was computed for each run of the simula-
tion, and then averaged over the 100 runs performed. The result is a very skewed distribution,
with a very high number of one-man project and some big projects. The first entries of the
density of projects can be seen in Table 1: projects with one developer are very common,
while the density of other project types drops instantly to low values. Note that this mass of
one-man projects, that are created and then abandoned, are a result of optimal play and not
of errors. It is optimal for a player to launch a project when there are no better alternatives
10For details, see Appendix A
9
3 SIMULATION
available. As soon as someone else has opened a better alternative, or the elimination process
has freed positions in other projects, it is optimal to abandon the project and let it die.
A log-log plot of the simulated data on the distribution of developers across projects can be
found in Figure 3. The log-log distribution can be fitted by a power-law. The fit is performed
using gls on the log of the variables, and is highly significant (at more than 1%). The actual
data from the SourceForge.net archive can be seen in Figure 1 on page 2. While the slope and
the intercept are not really the same, the overall simulated picture is quite similar to the real
data. The simulation was performed with only 100 subjects, and in an admittedly rather
trivial setting; nonetheless, the analysis of the data show that optimal behaviour by a number
of agents put within the interactive context of a community as described by the model can
lead to the creation of many abandoned small projects and just a few big projects.
Intercept
Slope ***
*
Power-law log-linear fit
Figure 3: Simulated data, N=100, T=500, δ = 0.2
The model works as an evolutionary selection mechanism, too. Since players are always
choosing the best option available, the average quality of projects opened at any period grows.
Moreover, players that are eliminated might find it optimal to launch a new project, that will
be abandoned if not successful, but that, if successful, could contribute to give more and better
options to all the other players. The average pij for each period has been plotted in Figure 4,
right. The data show a highly significant positive relation between the average pij and time.
The very same mechanism can be seen in action in Figure 4, left, that summarises the
number of players that are out in each period. This is an inverse relation w.r.t. the average
personal probability seen on the right; again, the data show a highly significant negative
relation: as periods accumulate, the average number of players out drops steadily.
Even if the rules followed by players are trivially simple - yet optimal - the aggregate
results emerging from the simulations show at least two interesting features: 1. aggregate
10
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Intercept
Slope ***
***
Intercept
Slope ***
***
Average number of players out in each period 
Figure 4: Simulated data, evolutionary effects of the model
distribution of players across projects shows features very similar to the real picture; 2. the
model has an evolutionary nature, in which the overall quality of projects increases in time
and the overall welfare of the participants increases too. It is now time to question the micro-
foundations of the model: do real agents, when put into a situation as the one described in
the model, behave as assumed - i.e. always spot and play the optimal strategy? This question
can be properly answered by a lab experiment.
4 The experiment
Experiments have been present in economics since the 1940s as teaching and/or clarifying
devices; nonetheless, in recent years experiments have gained mainstream status, especially
after the award of the Nobel Prize to Vernon Smith in 2002. Experiments have been mainly
used to test the assumptions of theories, with a strong focus on behaviour. Experiments can
certainly serve other interesting purposes than behavioural assumption testing, and Vernon
Smith’s first experiments on markets were indeed not micro-behavioural experiments (Smith,
1962); nonetheless, experimental techniques have focused on predicting, eliciting, controlling
and testing the behaviour of human subjects when dealing with economic choices11.
In recent years there has been a partial convergence of Experimental Economics and Agent-
Based Computational Economics. As argued by Duffy (2006), many studies have used ACE
models to understand the macro implications of findings obtained in laboratory settings,
while a fewer number of studies has gone in the inverse direction, trying to use lab exper-
iments to refine the results of ACE models. This paper follows the last approach: a very
simple agent-based model is used as a benchmark, and a human subject experiment is run in
order to fine-tune the very simple behavioural assumptions of the ACE model.
The experiment was aimed at understanding subjects’ behaviour when playing by the
model rules. The subjects were put into the very same situation described by the model. For
reasons of tractability and budget constraints, the number of subjects was set to 12, a number
at which simulations showed that some interesting dynamics could emerge; moreover, the
11For a very clear and thorough methodological assessment of Experimental Economics, see (Guala, 2005)
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Intercept
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***
Figure 5: Simulations with N = 12. Left: Density of project sizes; Right: Average pij
game was played for 30 periods, to give the subjects room for learning and to see some action
in the project landscape. Extensive simulations were run for the chosen parameterization,
N = 12, T = 30, δ = 0.2, the aggregate results of the simulation for such a low number of
players being different from the ones detailed above. The main results for the simulations can
be seen in Figure 5: a skewed distribution appears and the average pij of players goes up in
time. Moreover, the total number of projects opened in a simulated session turned out to be
47.
The experimental design consisted of two treatment, between-subjects, i.e. with subjects
performing only one treatment. Both treatment were based on 12 players, playing for 30
periods, with δ = 0.2, and with the payoff accorded to player alive at the end of each period
set to 50 eurocents. In the Standard treatment, the standard version of the model was played; 2
sessions of the standard treatment were run. In the Pay-fee treatment, all the setting remained
unchanged, but joiners had to devolve 5 eurocents out of their payoff to the project-leader, if
they were not eliminated; if eliminated, they did not have to pay the fee. Conversely, leaders
collected fees from all joiners that were not eliminated. The Pay-Fee treatment had the same
general solution already found for the basic model: even when taking into account the fee to
be paid, the optimal strategy is to maximise the probability of surviving the current period,
disregarding one’s role in a project.
The Pay-fee treatment was chosen in order to test if human subjects would tend to have a
bias favoring leadership, even if such leadership status should not enter their calculations of
the optimal strategy; moreover, it was a first step towards a more complex but realistic model,
in which leaders of successful projects can collect extra gains from their leadership status.
5 Experimental results
The experiment consisted of 3 session with 12 players in each; it was performed at University
of Milano Bicocca EELAB12. Overall, the model could account for ∼ 80% of the choices made,
i.e. ∼ 80% of the choices were optimal. The discussion of experimental results will be done as
12For details, see Appendix B
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Figure 6: Density of project size, experimental data, sessions 1, 2 (standard) and 3 (pay-fee)
# of devs Simulation Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
1 0.408 0.41 0.5 0.68
2 0.233 0.25 0.15 0.21
3 0.161 0.21 0.16 0.06
4 0.082 0.09 0.09 0.03
5 0.0345 0.01 0.04 0.01
6 0.0345 0.02 0.02 0.01
Table 2: Left tail of the distribution of projects by size, Simulated data
follows: we will first outline the aggregate, macro results of the experiment, to appreciate that
they are quite similar to the 12-players simulations discussed above; then we will perform
some statistical tests on the 3 sessions, to see if there was a treatment effect; finally, we will try
and fit a model of behaviour able to explain the mistakes that were made by the subjects.
5.1 Aggregate results
Aggregate results from the three sessions were quite similar to the results obtained by sim-
ulating the model with N = 12 and T = 30. Figure 6 displays the density of projects with
different number of players in them for the three sessions. A skewed distribution appears,
that is similar to the simulated one; actually, the distribution is more skewed in the experi-
mental sessions than in the simulated data, as can be seen from Table 2
Moreover, the experiment replicated the evolutionary nature of the model: the average pij
of the players in all three session showed increases very similar to the simulated ones; data
could be fitted by ols with significant slopes in all three sessions. The three plots, albeit quite
small, can be seen in Figure 7.
Finally, the total number of projects launched turned out to be different from the one pre-
dicted. The simulations predicted a value of 47 projects opened in the 30 periods; this datum
for the three session turned out to be S1 : 42, S2 : 82, S3 : 50. Overall, since the players did
behave as assumed four out of five times, the aggregate results could not look much different.
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Figure 7: Density of project size, experimental data, sessions 1, 2 (standard) and 3 (pay-fee)
5.2 Are sessions different?
In order to assess whether there was a treatment effect or not, we have to show that the
sessions produced indeed different results. The pay-fee treatment fo session 3 included an
extra bonus for leadership that should not have altered the incentives faced by subjects, since
the optimal strategy remained unchanged. If the treatment had effect, we could argue that
human players look for leadership more when they get returns from that, even if these returns
are not related to the optimal behaviour. If such a treatment effect existed, it could be the
first step towards building a more comprehensive moel of developers behaviour, taking into
account more linkages between rank in the project (or relative success) and payoff, turning
the model into a more strategic and more complete game. The descriptive statistics of the
quotas of optimal and suboptimal play in the three sessions are resumed in Table 3.
S1 S2 S3 Total %
Total # choices 348 348 348 1044 -
Non-optimal 67 74 69 210 -
% 19.25% 21.26% 19.83% 20.11% -
Table 3: optimality in the three sessions
When considering aggregate error rates, the three sessions look indeed very similar. Stan-
dard non-parametric tests, like the Mann-Whitney U and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the data come from the same empirical distribution. The
results for these tests are resumed in Table 4.
Session
S1 vs. S2 S1 vs S3 S2 vs S3
Optimality KS 1 1 1
MW 0.784 0.640 0.458
Error Type KS 0.042 0.001 0.000
MW 0.834 0.000 0.004
Table 4: Sessions - Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Withney tests
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Stay L Stay J Join Best Join Other Draw out Draw L Draw J
Stay - - W W D D D
Join Best L C - W D D D
Draw L C P W - - -
Table 5: Types of errors
But not all errors are equal. Out of the ∼ 20% suboptimal choices, we could identify five
types of errors, according to the situation a player was facing at the moment of the error, and
what the optimal choice at that precise time was (Table 5):
Conservative (C): players prefer to stay in the current project even if other, better projects are
available. This case accounts for 13% of all errors.
Excess Draw (D): players should join an existing project, or switch to a better project, but
choose to draw instead. This is by far the most common error, accounting for ∼ 57% of
all errors.
Leadership (L): players that are leaders prefer to stay in the project they lead instead of
switching to the best available alternative. Note that in Standard treatment leadership
is just a label; in Pay-fee treatment leadership does indeed generate value, but should
not interfere with the decision. 19% of all errors, up to 34% on the Pay-fee treatment.
Prudent (P): It would be best to draw, but players join an existing project that gives them a
survival probability < 0.5. Note: this never happened.
Plain Wrong (W): players fail to spot the best available option, and join a suboptimal project,
knowing they will not be leaders. I don’t find any other possible explanation that they
were wrong. 10% of all errors
When considering the distribution of errors by type, the three sessions appear indeed
different. As can be seen from Table 4, the demanding Kolmogorov-Smirnov test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis of equality between samples between sessions 1 and 3 and between
sessions 2 and 3, while rejecting, but not as strongly, equality between sessions 1 and 2, which
by design were supposed to be equal. The Mann-Whitney test, though, while still rejecting
equality of samples between S1 and S3 and between S2 and S3, cannot reject the null in the
case of S1 vs S2, as we would expect. The evidence is then mixed, but we can say that, at the
level of error type, session 3 was indeed different from the two standard sessions, even if these
two were not so different from one another.
The sample being so small, the differences between sessions 1 and 2 could be traced back
to two, very different, outliers in the experimental subjects: in session 1, a subject was “plain
wrong” nine out of thirty times, and ended up earning the lowest payoff of all the experiment,
while in session 2, a subject adopted the strategy of always launching new projects, making
an excess draw error twenty-two out of thirty times, earning below-average payoff.
Session 3 induced different types of errors in the subjects (see Table 6). Leadership errors
increased fourfold, fueled by the players’ attempts to earn the joiners fees, and Conservative
errors decreased to zero, as staying in the “wrong” projects as joiners was clearly now a less
attractive alternative. All these changes in error types were due to the framing of the problem,
and to a small alteration of the payoffs that should not have changed the way a rational player
behaves.
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Error Types
Conservative 22 7 0 29 13.81%
Excess Draw 24 58 38 120 57.14%
Leadership 9 7 24 40 19.05%
Prudent 0 0 0 0 0%
Plain wrong 12 2 7 21 10.00%
Table 6: Distribution of error types across sections
5.3 A model of individual behaviour
A more ambitious approach to analysing the data of the three experimental sessions is to
try and fit a model of behaviour that could describe both the optimal choices and the errors.
Since no subject ever committed Prudent errors, the possible outcomes of the experiment were
of five types: the optimal action plus four different error types. The optimal choice is well
defined and unique for each period, but not across subjects: subjects take part in the game
at each period from different angles, or perspectives, and the optimal action is conditional
on their current state and the overall landscape they face. But nonetheless, it is in principle
possible to attach a probability to each type of error, and then model these probabilities as
functions of the subject’s peculiar characteristics, such as the demographic variables collected
in the experiment through a questionnaire, or other indicators of the situation the player was
facing at the moment.
After having defined probabilities for each possible outcome, and having specified a model
of how these probabilities could depend on various subject-specific variables, it is possible to
estimate the impact of any of these variables on behaving optimally or committing one of the
four error types with maximum likelihood.
While this has not yet been done, a first trial in this direction has been attempted. Let’s
define the probabilities attached to each type of error as:
pc: probability of committing “conservative” error. Optimality would imply to switch to a
new project, but player stays in current project.
pd: probability of committing “excess draw” error. Optimality would imply joining, or stay-
ing, but the player draws.
pl: probability of committing “leadership” error. Optimality would imply switching, but
player stays in the project in which he is leader.
pw: probability of committing “plain wrong” error. Optimality would imply join project j,
but player joins k instead, with V ALUE(j) > V ALUE(k).
1− pc − pd − pl − pw: residual probability of having chosen the “correct“ option.
Each of these probabilities is a function of several subject-specific variables. The main
attempt of the exercise is to try and explain excess draws, as they appear to be the most
frequent mistake made by human subjects with respect to their electronic counterparts. For
simplicity, the three sessions have been pooled to have more observations. The variables that
have been identified so far for this exercise are:
16
5.3 Individual behaviour 5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
demographics: sex, age, economics, hi-school-grade. [demo]. Behaviour could be explained
by gender, age, or prior high-school performance, or else the variables could just act as
controls.
p-difference: difference in value from current pij to the probability that could be attained if
the player moved to the best available option [pdiff]. The idea is that with a small
premium for change, a player might be induced in committing Conservative and Lead-
ership mistakes.
out: a dummy that takes value of 1 if the player was eliminated in period t−1, and 0 otherwise
[out-1]. A descriptive analysis of the data hints at a relationship between being out
and excess draw: when a player is out, it could be more likely that he will launch a
new project even if there is a project available with a pij available for him that is higher
than the rational expectations from launching a new project. In a sense, being out could
increase the risk-propension of the subject, while a player that comfortably sits in a
project and is not eliminated could think twice before leaving his place to risk a new
project on his own.
max-available-value: the maximum pij available to a player [maxavval]. If the available
maximum probability is low, even if higher than the expectation from a draw, the player
might be tented to draw. When faced with pij = 0.7 for sure or a draw, a player might
be joining, while if the cost of risk was reduced, and say pij = 0.55, the same player
could be trying his luck and draw.
habit: average of the pij experienced by a player in the previous τ periods [habit]. Players
could become accostumed to high personal probabilities, and, when expelled from a
project, could prefer to draw rather than join an existing project with a lower personal
probability.
numerosity: number of available options. [num]. If there are many projects available on
screen, it is more likely that players will just be plain wrong, out of distraction.
With these variables set, a multinomial logit regression has been run on the pooled data
for the three sessions. The dependent variable is a polytomous variable, set to 0 if the player
behaved optimally, and getting values from 1 to 4 for the four types of errors (C,D,L,W), rep-
resenting mutually exclusive outcomes. The data being organised as a panel with dimensions
N = 36 and T = 30, the usual mixed logit model could not be directly applied; as a first
approximation, a mixed logit was run, pooling observations by subject.
The results are not very significant, and not very robust to changes in the specification of
the model. They are summarised in Table 7 just for reference, since the exercise was in any
case a preliminary analysis. Coefficients measure log-odds deviations from the baseline case,
assumed to be optimal behaviour.
The results shown in Table 7 only partially support the main claims made while introduc-
ing the different regressors. While some signs are in line with intuition coming from a casual
look at the data, others are clearly pointing in a direction that is not supported by the data,
or not even possible within the model: as an example, being out in the previous period can
not have an effect on the likelihood of committing type C or L errors, simply because these
errors can be committed only by a player that was still in the project the previous period. The
estimation are at the moment very rough. What needs to be done is to develop a custom log-
likelihood function and then estimate a custom model, possibly taking into account the panel
dimension of data.
17
6 CONCLUSION
pdiff out-1 maxavval habit num
C + + - NS +
D + NS NS NS +
L - + + NS +
W - + NS NS +
*Signs are shown only for coefficient that pass .05 significance
Table 7: Preliminary results of mixed logit, sign of the coefficient, NS = not significant
Correctly estimating behaviour is important because it could lead us to the next step, the
fine-tuning of the simulation model in order to better fit experimental evidence, and then
to new simulation runs in order to assess the macro consequences of the micro changes in
behaviour that the experiment highlighted.
6 Conclusion
The model deals with the allocation of time and effort within the communities of Open Source
Software developers; its main result is that high numbers of abandoned or one-man project
can coexist with a handful of big and growing projects, and that launching a project and then
abandoning it can indeed be the result of optimal play, as long as the players are all linked
together in an N-person, dynamic, path-dependent game. A skewed distribution of players
across projects emerges from the interactions of very simple agents, programmed to maximise
their current expected utility without looking into the future, or taking into account the other
player’s actions. In this sense, the model can account for the high rate of failures that can be
seen in online repositories: developers can find it optimal to launch their own project even in
the presence of valuable alternatives, because entering someone else’s project entails a cost,
and does not give enough benefits if the project is already too crowded; ex-post, though, the
project launched yields lower-than-expected results, and is then abandoned.
A crucial assumption of the model is the complete information enjoyed by the players
about the quality of existing projects. This assumption seems grounded, since Open Source
software is indeed open, and hence every developer can use the software for free, and also
have a look inside the black box to see how it works. In this respect, the model could also
partly account for the success of Open Source software: the source code being open, develop-
ers find it much more easy to make optimal choices; moreover, the model shows evolutionary
characteristics, the simulations showing that as a result of the interplay between players, in
the long run only the better projects survive and the developers are all better off. To assess
how much these results depend on perfect information, a new treatment with less availale,
costly, hidden or private information could be developed.
The model is non-strategic, in order to keep things very simple, and allow us to perform
thorough simulations and a behavioural experiment. The experimental results support the
main behavioural assumption, i.e. that in case of complete informations the players are
able to spot the best strategy, but interestingly highlights some consistent patterns of hu-
man behaviour, namely the excess confidence, resulting in an excess number of projects being
launched, and the leadership bias, resulting in players sticking to their leadership status in a
project, even when it would not be optimal to do so.
While a full-fledged model to account for the behaviour of subjects in the experiments is
still to be developed, these insights will be very important in changing the basic assumptions
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of the model; after having established a new model, or a new set of possible behaviours within
the model, new simulations could be run and possibly result in a better fit with the real data.
Finally, the model, and the methodology adopted to tackle the issue, could form the core
of a more complete exploration of the issues raised by the existence, and sustained growth, of
Open Source software and of other Open contents on and off the Internet, including the study
of all the new forms of decentralised cooperation among strangers, that seem to replace the
markets in a growing part of our daily experiences.
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Appendices
A Details on the simulation of the model
The simulation was written in Python scripting language (van Rossum, 1995), using the scien-
tific extensions in Pylab (NumPy, SciPy, MatPlotLib) and the R-Python plugin (RPy). Python
is definitely not a fast computing language, but is very easy, flexible, and thanks to the exten-
sions can be used to easily build a simulation from the ground up, automating the collection
of statistics and the making of graphs directly within the simulation program. NumPy pro-
vides python with fast array manipulation and calculation; SciPy integrates maximisation
routines and other useful mathematical computation abilities in Python; MatPlotLib provides
extensions to generate .pdf, .svg, .png and other types of plots directly from the simulation
code; finally, RPy allows to use R commands directly into the Python code. This last feature
was not used in the code, but turned out to be useful in building the graphics. The code is
available on demand.
B Experimental details and instructions
The experimental sessions and the pilot were conducted in the month of November, 2008, in
Milano, Italy.
The pilot was held with my PhD colleagues in Universita` di Milano Lab, November 14th,
2008. It featured 6 subjects, and had the sole intention of testing the experimental software.
The data collected were not analysed and are not included in the results shown in this paper.
The three experimental sessions were held in the Universita` di Milano-Bicocca Experimen-
tal Economics Lab (EELAB), November 20th, 2008. Three treatments, with 12 subjects each,
were conducted. 24 subjects were tested on the Standard treatment, and 12 on the Entry Fee
treatment. Subjects were recruited amongst undergraduate students, using standard recruit-
ing procedures. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The 3 sessions had an average payment of slightly more than 11 e, for an
overall cost of 397, 2 e
The instructions (in Italian) for the two treatments follow. The z-Tree binary treatment file
(or its exported text counterpart) are available on demand.
B.1 Standard Treatment
Benvenuto!
Stai per prendere parte a un esperimento economico. Ti sara` chiesto di prendere alcune
semplici decisioni, e in base ai risultati delle tue decisioni potrai guadagnare fino a un mas-
simo di 15 euro. Le scelte che farai e i dati che fornirai nel corso dell’esperimento sono anon-
imi. Sarai identificato unicamente dal numero del PC a cui sei seduto. All’entrata ti e` stato
un foglietto con il numero del PC a cui ti sei seduto: conservalo. L’esperimento durera` circa
un’ora. alla fine dell’esperimento ti verra` immediatamente corrisposto quanto da te guadag-
nato. Dovrai compilare la semplice ricevuta che hai trovato nella tua postazione, e conseg-
narla unitamente al foglietto con il numero del PC. L’esperimento dura 30 periodi. In ogni
periodo dovrai fare una semplice scelta: dovrai decidere se avviare, oppure entrare in un
progetto.
Ad ogni periodo potrai scegliere se:
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1. Avviare un progetto: un progetto viene creato. Il progetto ha un’unica caratteristica: la
probabilita` di sopravvivere fino al periodo successivo. Quando crei un progetto, viene
assegnata al progetto una probabilita` di sopravvivenza; questa probabilita` e` un numero
casuale tra zero e uno, in cui ogni valore ha la stessa probabilita` di essere estratto. La
probabilita` che verra` assegnata al progetto ti e` ignota prima che tu scelga di avviare
un progetto. Se sei l’iniziatore del progetto, ne sei il leader e ne erediti interamente la
probabilita` di sopravvivenza: la tua probabilita` di sopravvivenza e` esattamente quella
del progetto che hai appena creato.
2. Entrare in un progetto esistente: se esistono progetti aperti da altri giocatori, puoi scegliere
di entrare in uno dei loro progetti. In questo caso erediterai la probabilita` di soprav-
vivenza di quel progetto, diminuita secondo il tuo grado nel progetto. Essere il secondo
a entrare in un progetto implica una probabilita` di sopravvivere minore del leader, ma
maggiore rispetto a essere il terzo, o il quarto... e cos via.
E’ sempre possibile abbandonare il progetto in cui si e` per aderire a un altro; ma questo
implica lasciare il progetto corrente, in quanto si puo` essere solo in un progetto alla volta.
Questo significa che in ogni periodo potrete fare una e una sola scelta, cioe` barrare una e una
sola casella. Sullo schermo appariranno tutte le opzioni aperte in ogni periodo, con la proba-
bilita` di sopravvivenza (gia` scontata per il grado che andrai a ricoprire) e il grado che otterrai
se entri nel progetto. Alla fine di ogni periodo, un secondo numero casuale compreso tra zero
e uno viene estratto: e` la soglia di passaggio del turno. Se questo numero e` piu` alto della tua
probabilita` di sopravvivenza, sarai eliminato e fuori dai giochi fino alla fine del turno; se e`
uguale, o piu` basso, sei ancora in gioco. Tutti i giocatori ancora in gioco alla fine del turno
ricevono 50 centesimi di euro; i giocatori eliminati non ricevono nulla. I centesimi guadagnati
vengono accumulati nel corso dell’esperimento. Alla fine di ogni periodo sullo schermo ap-
paiono il tuo guadagno nel periodo corrente e il guadagno accumulato fino a quel punto. Se
sarai eliminato, inizierai il periodo successivo fuori dai giochi; potrai nuovamente scegliere
se entrare in uno dei progetti esistenti, con la probabilita` e nel ruolo previsti da quel progetto,
oppure se lanciare un tuo progetto, estraendo una nuova probabilita` di sopravvivenza ca-
suale compresa tra zero e uno. Se sarai in gioco, inizierai il periodo successivo all’interno del
progetto in cui sei entrato nel periodo precedente. Avrai comunque a disposizione 3 scelte:
restare nel progetto in cui sei, unirti ad un altro progetto lasciando quello in cui sei, oppure
avviare un progetto nuovo, estraendo una nuova probabilita` di sopravvivenza. Nota che
l’eliminazione e` sempre individuale: vengono eliminati i singoli giocatori, NON i progetti.
Un progetto resta attivo finch‘e ha un giocatore al suo interno, anche quando il giocatore che
per primo l’aveva iniziato dovesse essere eliminato.
Prima di iniziare i periodi dell’esperimento vero e proprio, verranno svolti 5 periodi di
prova, in cui potrai impratichirti con il funzionamento dell’esperimento. I centesimi guadag-
nati in questi periodi non danno diritto ad alcun pagamento, e saranno quindi azzerati prima
di iniziare l’esperimento vero e proprio. Lo sperimentatore ti dira` con chiarezza quando fini-
ranno i periodi di prova e iniziera` l’esperimento vero e proprio, in cui i centesimi guadagnati
saranno effettivamente pagati. Alla fine del trentesimo periodo, apparira` sul tuo schermo
un breve questionario. Ti ricordiamo ancora che i dati che immetterai saranno anonimi.
Dopodich‘e, verra` visualizzato il tuo guadagno finale, in euro. Subito dopo l’esperimento, lo
sperimentatore procedera` al pagamento di quanto guadagnato. Una volta che l’esperimento
sara` finito, compila la ricevuta e presentati al banco dello sperimentatore con la ricevuta com-
pilata e con il foglietto su cui e` indicato il numero del tuo PC.
Domande?
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B.2 Entry Fee Treatment
Benvenuto!
Stai per prendere parte a un esperimento economico. Ti sara` chiesto di prendere alcune
semplici decisioni, e in base ai risultati delle tue decisioni potrai guadagnare fino a un mas-
simo di 15 euro. Le scelte che farai e i dati che fornirai nel corso dell’esperimento sono anon-
imi. Sarai identificato unicamente dal numero del PC a cui sei seduto. All’entrata ti e` stato
un foglietto con il numero del PC a cui ti sei seduto: conservalo. L’esperimento durera` circa
un’ora. alla fine dell’esperimento ti verra` immediatamente corrisposto quanto da te guadag-
nato. Dovrai compilare la semplice ricevuta che hai trovato nella tua postazione, e conseg-
narla unitamente al foglietto con il numero del PC. L’esperimento dura 30 periodi. In ogni
periodo dovrai fare una semplice scelta: dovrai decidere se avviare, oppure entrare in un
progetto.
Ad ogni periodo potrai scegliere se:
1. Avviare un progetto: un progetto viene creato. Il progetto ha un’unica caratteristica: la
probabilita` di sopravvivere fino al periodo successivo. Quando crei un progetto, viene
assegnata al progetto una probabilita` di sopravvivenza; questa probabilita` e` un numero
casuale tra zero e uno, in cui ogni valore ha la stessa probabilita` di essere estratto. La
probabilita` che verra` assegnata al progetto ti e` ignota prima che tu scelga di avviare
un progetto. Se sei l’iniziatore del progetto, ne sei il leader e ne erediti interamente la
probabilita` di sopravvivenza: la tua probabilita` di sopravvivenza e` esattamente quella
del progetto che hai appena creato. Avviare un progetto comporta un beneficio: in
qualita` di leader del progetto incasserai i pedaggi di entrata che verranno pagati da tutti
coloro che saranno entrati nel tuo progetto, se saranno in gioco alla fine del periodo.
2. Entrare in un progetto esistente: se esistono progetti aperti da altri giocatori, puoi scegliere
di entrare in uno dei loro progetti. In questo caso erediterai la probabilita` di soprav-
vivenza di quel progetto, diminuita secondo il tuo grado nel progetto. Essere il secondo
a entrare in un progetto implica una probabilita` di sopravvivere minore del leader, ma
maggiore rispetto a essere il terzo, o il quarto... e cos via. Entrare in un progetto ha un
costo: qualora tu sia in gioco alla fine del turno, dovrai pagare 5 centesimi di euro al
leader del progetto in cui sei entrato; qualora tu venga eliminato alla fine del turno, non
pagherai nulla.
E’ sempre possibile abbandonare il progetto in cui si e` per aderire a un altro; ma questo
implica lasciare il progetto corrente, in quanto si puo` essere solo in un progetto alla volta.
Questo significa che in ogni periodo potrete fare una e una sola scelta, cioe` barrare una e una
sola casella. Sullo schermo appariranno tutte le opzioni aperte in ogni periodo, con la proba-
bilita` di sopravvivenza (gia` scontata per il grado che andrai a ricoprire) e il grado che otterrai
se entri nel progetto. Alla fine di ogni periodo, un secondo numero casuale compreso tra zero
e uno viene estratto: e` la soglia di passaggio del turno. Se questo numero e` piu` alto della tua
probabilita` di sopravvivenza, sarai eliminato e fuori dai giochi fino alla fine del turno; se e`
uguale, o piu` basso, sei ancora in gioco. Tutti i giocatori ancora in gioco alla fine del turno
ricevono 50 centesimi di euro; i giocatori eliminati non ricevono nulla. I centesimi guadag-
nati vengono accumulati nel corso dell’esperimento. Alla fine di ogni periodo sullo schermo
appaiono il tuo guadagno nel periodo corrente e il guadagno accumulato fino a quel punto.
Inoltre, tutti coloro che hanno scelto di entrare in un progetto, se ancora in gioco, verseranno
5 centesimi (dei 50 guadagnati) al leader del progetto in cui sono; i leader, invece, riceveranno
5 centesimi (aggiuntivi rispetto ai 50 guadagnati) da ogni giocatore ancora in gioco che abbia
aderito al loro progetto. Se sarai eliminato, inizierai il periodo successivo fuori dai giochi;
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potrai nuovamente scegliere se entrare in uno dei progetti esistenti, con la probabilita` e nel
ruolo previsti da quel progetto, oppure se lanciare un tuo progetto, estraendo una nuova
probabilita` di sopravvivenza casuale compresa tra zero e uno. Se sarai in gioco, inizierai il
periodo successivo all’interno del progetto in cui sei entrato nel periodo precedente. Avrai
comunque a disposizione 3 scelte: restare nel progetto in cui sei, unirti ad un altro progetto
lasciando quello in cui sei, oppure avviare un progetto nuovo, estraendo una nuova prob-
abilita` di sopravvivenza. Nota che l’eliminazione e` sempre individuale: vengono eliminati
i singoli giocatori, NON i progetti. Un progetto resta attivo finch‘e ha un giocatore al suo
interno, anche quando il giocatore che per primo l’aveva iniziato dovesse essere eliminato.
Prima di iniziare i periodi dell’esperimento vero e proprio, verranno svolti 5 periodi di
prova, in cui potrai impratichirti con il funzionamento dell’esperimento. I centesimi guadag-
nati in questi periodi non danno diritto ad alcun pagamento, e saranno quindi azzerati prima
di iniziare l’esperimento vero e proprio. Lo sperimentatore ti dira` con chiarezza quando fini-
ranno i periodi di prova e iniziera` l’esperimento vero e proprio, in cui i centesimi guadagnati
saranno effettivamente pagati. Alla fine del trentesimo periodo, apparira` sul tuo schermo
un breve questionario. Ti ricordiamo ancora che i dati che immetterai saranno anonimi.
Dopodich‘e, verra` visualizzato il tuo guadagno finale, in euro. Subito dopo l’esperimento, lo
sperimentatore procedera` al pagamento di quanto guadagnato. Una volta che l’esperimento
sara` finito, compila la ricevuta e presentati al banco dello sperimentatore con la ricevuta com-
pilata e con il foglietto su cui e` indicato il numero del tuo PC.
Domande?
25
